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Abstract 
 
The delivery of public services by nonprofit and for-profit providers alters the nature of 
services and jobs, often in unintended and undesired ways. We argue that these effects 
depend on the degree to which the service is ‘marketised’, i.e. whether its funder subjects it to 
price-based competition. Using case studies of British and German employment services, this 
paper scrutinises the link between funding practices and service quality. Of particular concern 
in marketised employment services is the problem of ‘creaming and parking’, in which 
providers select job-ready clients for services and neglect clients more distant from the labour 
market. We explore three questions. What are the mechanisms through which marketisation 
produces creaming and parking? What are the differences between these mechanisms in 
commercial and non-commercial service providers? Which national institutions might serve 
as a buffer for the landscape of service provision facing price-based competition?   
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Introduction 
Across the world ‘the market’ has become a general-purpose toolbox for solving policy 
problems, and employment services – the task of moving jobless people into, or towards, paid 
employment – a much-studied site where these tools are used (e.g. Hipp and Warner, 2008; 
Jantz et al 2015). In these complex services for vulnerable clients, the policy literature often 
finds providers responding to marketisation by providing only a minimal service for clients 
deemed distant from the labour market and focusing attention on job-ready clients, a problem 
known as ‘creaming and parking’ (e.g. Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008; Rees et al, 2013b).    
In the employment relations literature, these international trends toward contracting 
and their consequences are examined as part of ‘New Public Management’ (NPM). 
Prominent issues include the erosion of professional autonomy and deterioration in the 
quantity and quality of staff-client interactions (e.g. Foster and Hoggett, 1999; Baines, 2004). 
While NPM has not eradicated the ethos of public service in restructured workplaces (Hebson 
et al, 2003; Rosenthal and Peccei, 2006), it often leads to the devaluing of formal 
qualifications and exit of experienced workers (Ranald, 1999) and puts financial pressures on 
nonprofit organisations (Cunnningham and James, 2008).  
Among the tools of NPM are contracting and vouchers, market mechanisms that can 
lead to the above-mentioned outcomes. They can also have disorganising effects on collective 
bargaining and worker participation institutions, contributing to wage restraint and work 
intensification (Doellgast, 2012; Greer et al, 2013). Policies to mitigate them include transfer 
of undertakings and statutory wage rules (Grimshaw and Miozzo, 2009) and social criteria in 
public procurement (Jaehrling, 2015). Less understood are particular market mechanisms or 
the conditions under which they have these effects.  
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This paper contributes to this literature, first by defining and operationalizing 
marketisation in a way that can be used to study diverse public-service contexts. Second, it 
identifies two mechanisms through which marketisation produces creaming and parking. We 
ask, what are the mechanisms through which marketisation produces creaming and parking? 
And, what are the differences between these mechanisms in commercial and non-commercial 
service providers? Third, it compares employment services in Germany and Britain, which in 
theory present contrasting images of ‘coordinated’ versus ‘liberal’ political economies (Hall 
and Soskice 2001). We ask, which national institutions might serve as a buffer for the 
landscape of service provision facing price-based competition? We compare employment 
services in the two countries in terms of transactions (i.e. funding), governance, the labour 
process and client selection (i.e. whether there is creaming and parking). 
We have three main findings about these organizations under marketisation. First, a 
‘commercial model’ emerges of mostly for-profit services, characterised by tight 
management control and institutionalised creaming and parking. Second, a ‘non-commercial 
model’ of nonprofit and public sector providers declines, as financial pressures mount on 
organisations with more professional autonomy in the labour process; these organisations 
resist pressures to cream and park with varying degrees of success. Third, these effects are 
weaker under German public purchasing because the funder supports institutionalised formal 
qualifications. 
In what follows, we ground our research questions in the literature, present our 
methods and data, and discuss broader implications.  
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Marketisation, professional autonomy, and service quality in employment services 
Creaming and parking is a kind of ‘adverse selection’ where clients are selected for 
assistance in inverse proportion to need. Lipsky (1980) observed it in his classic street-level 
bureaucracy study: front-line public-sector workers in the US sorted their clients because 
they did not have sufficient time to meet the needs of everyone in their caseload. When 
confronted with quantitative targets, they freed up time to hit targets by neglecting more 
difficult-to-serve clients (106-107).  
Evaluations of employment services have found creaming and parking in the US 
(Anderson et al 1993), Germany (Bernhard and Kruppe 2010), Britain (Rees et al 2013b), the 
Netherlands and Australia (Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008). But it is not universal. Studies on 
French employment services have found sorting for ‘opportunity’ (i.e. to identify available 
services) and ‘employability’ (i.e. to identify clients who can be placed in the available jobs) 
(Paugam 1993; Schulte et al 2017). Under creaming and parking, sorting for employability 
dominates, with client attitudes, body language and demeanour, social status, and age used by 
advisors as signals of employability (Rosenthal and Peccei 2006). These job-ready clients are 
‘creamed’ so providers can claim the incentive payments, while the others are ‘parked’ to 
minimise spending. This is a service quality problem, since it entails neglect of clients 
targeted by public policy; many programme evaluators view job outcomes for clients who 
would have achieved them without intervention as ‘deadweight’ to be deducted from net 
effects (e.g. De Koning 1993).  
Quasi-markets theory, the dominant approach to government-funded services in the 
policy literature, suggests financial incentives as an explanation for adverse selection. Le 
Grand (2003) argues that markets for public services differ from the theoretical constructs of 
economists, since they are created by a government-purchasing agent and involve a mixture 
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of private, nonprofit, and public-sector organisations. Le Grand argues that public purchasing 
practices set incentives, and these can be used to encourage greater responsiveness of front-
line workers to client needs (7-11).  
It is unclear, however, which incentives would prevent creaming and parking in 
employment services. While Le Grand (2003) aims to ‘turn pawns to queens’ by empowering 
individual service users, the social policy behind employment services is work-first and 
emphasises client compulsion over free choice (Greer 2015). Adverse selection is likely when 
the government funder pays for job outcomes, since it creates a material incentive to place 
people in jobs without payment for harder-to-measure outcomes (Carter and Whitworth 
2015). The architect of the British employment services market acknowledged the problem in 
calling for the payment system to be informed by an ‘analysis of the contractual incentive 
structure to minimise “creaming” and “parking”’ (Freud 2007). Quasi-markets theory has yet 
to discover a solution.  
One alternative is to view marketisation as bigger than the transaction, a logic of 
governance that includes both funding and provision. Whether they see marketisation as a 
response to past bad performance of ALMPs (Sol and Westerveld 2005) or point out that 
marketisation often fails to deliver on its promises (Bredgaard and Larsen 2008), much of the 
policy literature on employment services follows Considine and Lewis (2003) in defining 
marketisation in terms of the overall principles of public management and the work-first 
welfare state. Jantz et al (2016) define ‘market accountability’ as ‘the organization of 
exchange via competition and contracts’ where the criteria of success are ‘price, quality, and 
return on investment’ and contrasted with democratic, administrative, and network 
accountability. These forms of accountability are often combined: in Britain quantitative 
outcome measurement is mixed with light-touch regulation of providers, while in Germany 
market accountability complements tight administrative control over providers’ activities.   
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Policy literature suggests that non-commercial providers would resist creaming and 
parking. Parking hard-to-serve clients may violate the ethos of front-line workers in non-
commercial providers, as in Divay’s (2008) study of French providers, where staff promote 
‘voluntary participation of the unemployed, needs analysis, introspection . . . to help the 
unemployed to be or become autonomous’ (680). Under ‘network accountability’, where 
evaluation is dependent in part on provider reputation among local peer groups rather than 
quantitative criteria (Jantz et al 2015), this resistance would be reinforced. The task itself 
could frustrate management control through its sheer complexity (Brodkin 2008).  
But this literature also suggests a shift toward more commercial provision, in line 
with the general aim of NPM to make government behave more like the private sector. 
Providers may face financial pressures to act more like their newer commercial competitors, 
disrupting local networks that underpin the complex and customised services that they 
provide (Hipp and Warner 2008). Furthermore, as this literature documents, commercial 
providers have emerged in Britain that impose tight performance management on staff and 
that engage heavily in creaming and parking (Rees et al 2014b). 
The policy literature provides many insights to the causes of creaming and parking in 
marketised employment services: the role of the transaction and broader differences in 
governance. But the specific features of markets that produce these outcomes are unclear. We 
seek answers to two questions. What are the mechanisms through which marketisation 
produces creaming and parking? What are the differences between these mechanisms in 
commercial and non-commercial service providers?  
Central to our approach is a clearer definition of marketisation, which is supplied by 
Doellgast and Greer (2017) and based on the comparative employment relations literature. 
Marketisation is the introduction or increase in price-based competition in transactions, along 
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four dimensions. Funders can increase frequency by ending ongoing guaranteed funding 
arrangements such as annual grants and replacing it with time-limited contracts. They can 
strengthen the price mechanism by ending cost-recovery arrangements, allowing prices to 
float according to supply and demand, and allocating contracts primarily on the basis of 
price. Funders can increase the standardisation of the service by specifying it a priori in a 
clear and detailed way that can be rolled out in diverse contexts. Finally they can open 
markets to new players by inviting for-profit firms to provide services traditionally delivered 
by nonprofits or the public sector.  
In employment relations and sociology of work, market pressures are usually defined 
diversely and at a lower level of abstraction. Marchington et al (2005) emphasise the 
introduction of new organisational boundaries in a diverse sample of workplaces; 
Cunningham et al (2013) highlight competition, prescriptive contracts, performance 
management, and reduced spending in the Scottish voluntary sector. In both of these studies, 
the market affects work by reducing the discretion of the employer and passing power to the 
funder or client (Marchington et al 2005; Cunningham 2008).   
The empirical focus in this literature is typically on the erosion of professional 
autonomy in the public or non-profit sectors. As Baines (2004) argues, work-first welfare 
reforms are conducive to the erosion of professional autonomy because they create ‘one-size-
fits-all’ social services aimed at servicing private employers and because they tend to use 
management by numbers, deskilling, and work intensification on the front line. Detailed 
control of white collar work using IT and lean management tools are widespread in the 
British civil service (Carter et al 2011) and US municipal social services (Esbenshade et al 
2016), which highlights the increasing speed of service. This literature also helps to explain 
parking by showing the reduced amount of time available for staff-client interaction (Foster 
and Hoggett 1998) and the exit of the staff from the sector who have the skills to address 
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complex needs (Ranald 1999). Job insecurity is another pressure on workers, given cuts to 
jobs often observed in privatised and marketised public services (Hermann and Flecker 2011; 
Cunningham et al 2013), which, we will see below, can contribute to tightening management 
control. 
While the policy literature examines organizations in terms of governance principles, 
the sociology of work literature examines in more depth the labour process within service 
providers. Commercial social services have not been studied in the sociology of work 
literature. But a core NPM principle is the blurring of boundaries between for-profit and 
government (or non-profit): non-commercial providers face pressure to become commercial. 
In new commercial organizations, work does not have to be deskilled or intensified, and 
worker representation and professional qualifications do not have to be marginalised, because 
tight management control systems exist from the outset (see Greer et al 2017).  
Our third question concerns the institutional conditions under which we observe such 
marketisation effects. Comparativists often find market outcomes depending on non-market 
institutions such as collective bargaining, its statutory underpinning, and its enforcement 
(Grimshaw and Miozzo 2008; Hermann and Flecker 2011) or strong skill formation and 
workplace-level worker participation (Doellgast 2012). Public-sector contracting can be 
modified to shore up such institutions, as Jaehrling (2015) argues, through rules that require 
compliance with labour standards, as is currently taking place in Germany.  These factors 
may serve as a buffer for strong professional autonomy in the face of marketisation. 
But it is questionable what happens to these institutional effects when they come into 
contact with marketisation (Greer and Doellgast 2017). As studies on worker posting show, 
market opening can produce uneven ‘rule enactment’ in industrial relations, producing wide 
within-country variation and gaps in workplace regulation (Wagner 2015). Greer et al (2013) 
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find that the introduction of market mechanisms led to a wave of privatisation of German 
hospitals, which led in some cases to conflict and the derecognition of collective agreements 
and in others to intensified labour-management cooperation. In German employment 
services, collective bargaining and works councils persisted in relatively protected market 
segments but were absent from highly disorganised institutions in more volatile segments 
(Greer et al 2017). This within-country diversity is one reason why studies detect no 
‘varieties of NPM’ corresponding to the typologies of welfare regimes or comparative 
capitalism (Bach and Bordogna, 2011).  
Our third question is, which national institutions could serve as a buffer for the 
landscape of employment service provision facing price-based competition? We explore this 
through a structured comparison of the four cases.  
Table 1 summarises the categories of our analysis, and figure 1 shows how they are 
related in our explanation. Grey arrows represent the rise of commercial model, black arrows 
represent the strain on non-commercial services, and the white arrow represents institutional 
conditions. 
  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE; INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Research methods 
In order to understand the effects of marketisation on workplaces, we examined a complex 
process spanning multiple organisational boundaries over a relatively long time period. 
Through eight years of field research we extended our framework beyond initial hypotheses 
and explored change over time. In keeping with case study methods (Yin 1990), we 
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triangulated each case through different interviewees (funding bodies, management, and 
front-line staff) and kinds of data (interviews, publicly available reports and statistics). In 
keeping with qualitative comparisons (Ragin 2008), we selected cases to vary on theoretically 
relevant conditions (ownership of provider, funding arrangements, other national institutions) 
and outcomes (creaming and parking), with an aim of ruling out or modifying initial 
hypotheses. We developed mid-range theory, specifying causal mechanisms repeated under 
specific conditions, rather than universal laws (e.g. Hedström and Swedberg 1998). 
While past studies examined creaming and parking in particular countries, the issue 
has not been studied comparatively. We chose Britain and Germany to gain variation in the 
sample, especially on the outcome of creaming and parking; we chose employment services 
because they include a shared set of tasks but varying market structures, both between and 
within countries. We expected strong between-country variation due to stronger institutions 
of skill formation and worker participation in German workplaces (Doellgast 2012) and the 
decline of administrative or democratic accountability in British employment services (Jantz 
et al 2015) and strong within-country variation in Germany due to the disorganizing effects 
of marketisation on these institutions (Greer et al 2013).  
Our case studies are informed by 77 interviews conducted in Britain and Germany in 
2006-11, mostly managers within the funders and the providers, but also trade unionists, 
umbrella bodies, and other policymakers, mostly with one respondent. These identified the 
market segments in the two countries and the effects of competition on workplaces and 
services. Within each country, we found different funding arrangements creating different 
kinds of competition, with different provider landscapes. 
In 2011-14 we conducted a second wave of 71 interviews in Britain and Germany, 
mostly with front-line workers and line managers, including 4 repeat interviews. We spent a 
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day each in 6 establishments talking to 3-5 front-line workers (1 at a time) and their line 
managers; we also interviewed trade unionists, umbrella bodies, purchasing professionals, 
policymakers, and (in Britain) senior managers at large for-profit providers. We used 
sampling to deal with two factors that could affect the outcome: task (only job placement 
services for clients deemed distant from the labour market) and local contracting markets 
(only urban areas with large employment services sectors). Wave 2 interviews explored 
transactions, the labour process, and the approach to job placement (i.e. creaming and 
parking). Table 2 describes our sample.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
We recorded nearly all interviews, typed up notes or word-for-word transcripts, and 
coded them with MaxQDA. In wave 1 we developed our key concepts, line of questioning, 
and research design; in wave 2 we had a more structured interview template and sample. Our 
concepts emerged through iterations of interviewing, coding, and discussing the data and 
codes (Eisenhardt 1989). We carried out a final ‘deductive’ top-down coding of all notes and 
transcripts using MaxQDA lexical search and coding functions to empirically assess the cases 
in terms of the categories in our analytical framework.  
In Great Britain our sample of providers changed, reflecting the market and 
organisational landscape. Wave 1 focused on non-commercial organisations – nonprofits and 
municipal departments – some small and some large, all with roots prior to marketisation and 
all experiencing severe resource scarcity due to funding cuts. In wave 2 we examined the rise 
of large commercial organisations in response to the Work Programme, which centralised the 
market by combining most employment services schemes across Great Britain (Wiggan 
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2015),  accounting for around half of the volume of employment services contracting, its 
importance reinforced by the decline of municipal funding and the abolition of two large 
regional funders. In wave 2 we interviewed senior managers at several large firms and then 
carried out site visits at 5 Work Programme providers (1 nonprofit, 1 municipality, and 2 
large commercial organisations), plus 1 nonprofit not in the Work Programme.  
In Germany our provider sample reflected the more varied market structure. The 
nonprofits we visited in both waves originated in the religious charity work and labour 
movement of the 19th and 20th centuries; others originated in the ‘new social movements’ of 
neighbourhood-based activists in the 1970s and 1980s (Bode 2003). These providers had 
formed local networks, usually funded by government grants, which had been disrupted by 
the introduction vouchers for training and placement and public purchasing for others in 
2002-5. We visited 4 commercial for-profit providers operating under vouchers and 
purchasing, including two multinationals. After numerous management interviews in waves 1 
and 2, we selected 2 providers for detailed attention: a for-profit provider operating under 
placement vouchers and a nonprofit operating under public purchasing. 
In the next sections we present the British and German material, organised by 
research question. Following the framework laid out in table 1, the first two sections describe 
cases in terms of transactions (i.e. funding), governance more generally, the labour process 
and client selection (i.e. whether there is creaming and parking); and the third deals with 
marketisation effects under different institutional conditions. 
 
The rise of commercial service models 
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In this section we explore the mechanism through which marketisation leads to the 
emergence of commercial providers where creaming and parking takes place. While 
collecting data we witnessed the rise of the British Work Programme (which began after we 
began data collection in 2010) and the functioning of German placement vouchers 
(introduced before our study in 2002). Both schemes squeezed prices to contain costs and 
used payment by results to focus attention on job-placement outcomes. In both, the providers 
were mainly for-profit, used tight management control using targets for front-line workers, 
and engaged in creaming and parking: sorting almost exclusively for employability, with job-
ready clients ‘creamed’ and needier clients ‘parked’.  
 
The British Work Programme is for some observers the paradigmatic case of marketised 
employment services (Jantz et al 2015), and this is reflected in the transaction. Prices were set 
through competitive bidding at the scheme’s outset, and the firm with the highest market 
share – Deloitte Ingeus – was the one that offered the deepest discounts (Greer et al 2017, 
appendix B). While the government predicted £500m in annual volume, funding was roughly 
half that due to discounts and the number and kind of placement outcomes (NAO 2014). 
Bidding was open: successful bidders included many with no experience providing 
employment services (Serco and G4S) and multinationals based elsewhere (the US-
Australian consortium Deloitte Ingeus and US-based Maximus). Aside from a few of the 
largest UK-based welfare-to-work specialists (A4e, Avanta, and Working Links), most 
experienced employment services providers became subcontractors of these much larger 
‘primes’, some of which outsourced all services and merely managed contracts. Figure 2 
summarises the Work Programme structure, including the funder (the Department for Work 
and Pensions [DWP]) and providers. 
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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The Work Programme privatised governance. In an attempt to harness the potential of the 
private sector to innovate, the government refrained from specifying the services in detail and 
gave contractors wide discretion to design services. The previous schemes had been too 
prescriptive, according to one senior civil servant: ‘contract out, but then tell the contractor 
what to do and then pay them for doing the activities rather than the outcome. It’s an odd way 
of using the private sector, really’ (manager 1, funder A, wave 2). The government reduced 
the danger of creaming and parking by differentiating payments: up to £13,700 for clients on 
the disability benefit Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) and £3700 for mainstream 
Jobseekers Allowance (JSA) clients.i In addition, minimum service levels were published 
online (DWP 2013), written by providers in their bids. These were vague, minimalist, and 
varied by contractor, and did not prevent firms from reducing spending for the ESA group by 
54% on average over the term of the contract (NAO 2014).   
The funder did not standardise services, but the primes did. The services included 
group interviews with employers, basic skills training, job-search coaching, and various 
online activities. Management interviewees reported investing millions into IT systems to 
manage staff, contractors, and clients (e.g. for-profit G). There were considerable similarities 
between our in-depth case-study organisations, nonprofit J and for-profit D, and each prime 
rolled out its ‘delivery model’ across ‘contract package areas’ as large as Scotland, Wales, or 
half of London. Some managers depicted this standardisation as the outcome of a long 
learning process: ‘A lot of our way why we’ve been successful is we have tested over the last 
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ten years . . . . We know what works and it fits’ (for-profit D). Others viewed it as a barrier to 
the ongoing innovation (e.g. for-profit E, for-profit H). 
The labour process of front-line workers we interviewed at the commercial providers 
was tightly controlled.  Management used IT systems to standardise, monitor and speed up 
processes and to communicate data, most notably performance outcomes, to front-line 
workers and the funder. Self-guided E-learning courses were common, and for-profit H was 
using call centres to make contacts with clients, both for booking meetings and gathering 
evidence to claim job-outcome payments.  
The constrained labour process was reflected in the way clients were selected. In all 
providers we visited, clients were assessed initially using an IT tool, in some cases without a 
front-line worker present. On this basis, the client would be assigned to one of three groups, 
usually red (multiple barriers to employment), green (job-ready), or amber (in between). The 
quickness of these processes was mentioned by several managers and front-line workers. ‘I 
wouldn’t recognise some of [my clients] if I passed them in the street. In fact there was one 
guy starts talking to me in the lift, then I realised that he was my next appointment’ (front-
line worker 1, for-profit D). As he and his colleagues told us, the average caseload in this 
provider was 180-200; caseloads under previous contracts had been 40-50. Here, the 
minimum service was one meeting, phone call, or email per fortnight.  
Every interviewee in this establishment saw monthly numerical targets of job 
placements as crucially important. All were aware that management could monitor their 
activities and performance in detail and in real time; and some used the IT system to 
continually compare their performance with that of their colleagues: ‘I always meet my 
targets. In fact, I go way past them. Then I’m looking at the guy next to me, who’s messing 
about and doesn’t care, and I’m thinking ‘why should I bother (front-line worker 2, for-profit 
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D)?” Workers reported that the pressure to hit targets took time away from other tasks, both 
benign (advocating for clients with complex needs such as lone parents [nonprofit C, front-
line worker 2]), and punitive (administrative follow-up to ensure sanctioning of noncompliant 
clients [for-profit D, front-line workers 2 & 3]).  
Job insecurity was part of the organizational model. Prior to the Work Programme 
insecurity was caused by short contracts and declining funding, leading to redundancies and 
staff transfers (trade union A, staff 1; trade union B, staff 1 &2; and HR consultant). In these 
providers, insecurity was often mentioned in connection with performance management. At 
for-profit D, front-line workers had in the previous 18 months been through two turnovers of 
contracts, leading to a transfer exercise, applying for a reduced number jobs, and a stressful 
assessment centre experience (front-line workers 3, 4, 5). Another problem was punitive 
firing, a sensitive topic. One front-line worker discussed it openly: ‘[My line manager] is a 
good guy; you can have a laugh with him. But if you said anything you’d be out the door,’ 
and ‘you must hit targets or you’re out the door’ (front-line worker 3). Others discussed it 
less directly, as when a manager reported leaving the for-profit sector because ‘I don’t 
believe in sacking people for not hitting their targets’ (nonprofit C, manager 3). 
Nonprofit K was similar to, but not the same as, the for-profits. It had a sophisticated 
IT system to monitor staff and clients, but targets were set at the group, rather than individual 
level. Clients were distributed to different members of staff based on distance from the labour 
market, with the largest caseload for the advisor responsible for ‘red’ clients and smallest 
caseloads for staff involved in quick job placements, a division of labour set collectively by 
the group (front-line workers 1-7). According to their line manager, this arrangement 
depended on good performance: other offices were under performance management by the 
central office due to their failure to hit targets (manager 3). 
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Evaluators found extensive creaming and parking at Work Programme providers, and 
our interviewees did little to hide it. Up to March 2014 job outcome payments were claimed 
for 11% of claimants of the disability benefit Employment and Support Allowance [ESA], 
well below the DWP’s forecast ‘minimum performance level’ of 22%, reflecting reduced 
spending on that group (NAO 2014). According to our interviewees, processes were designed 
to select clients for employability. At one large provider ‘red’ clients were assigned to an 
advisor whose caseload at any one time was 200 – and who told us that however he 
intervened many of his clients would remain unemployable (nonprofit J, front-line worker 6) 
– and the others were sent to advisors working more intensively with much smaller numbers 
of ‘green’ job-ready clients (front-line workers 4 and 5). At a second large provider, advisors 
had caseloads of uniform size but had tightly enforced job-placement targets, forcing front-
line staff to prioritise more job-ready clients. One worker told us that an unfortunate 
consequence of the targets culture was that she would prioritise the top 20% of clients (for-
profit D, front-line worker 3). Interviewees reported difficulty referring clients with complex 
needs to outside services or financial support for transportation or clothes for job interviews, 
mainly due to lacking funds (e.g. manager 3 and front-line worker 2, nonprofit C; front-line 
workers 1 & 2 public sector G).  
Many workers and managers we interviewed had a matter-of-fact attitude toward 
creaming and parking. One manager told us, ‘you couldn’t make ends meet without creaming 
and parking’, since the Work Programme rewarded providers only for job placements 
achieved (for-profit H). Another summarised the commercial logic of creaming and parking 
as a squeeze on resources brought about by price-based competition, compounded with the 
calculable risks of the price structure: 
So you get less people into work, and because you’re getting less people into work 
you target, and because it’s outcome based, you’re going to target your resources at 
	 18	
those people who are easiest to help. So you’re going to aggressively park and cream.  
You cream by targeting the easy ones, you park by identifying the people you can’t 
help and ignore them (for-profit E). 
They did not, however, view creaming and parking neutrally: these and other management 
and policy interviewees expressed frustration with it and discussed alternatives. The manager 
at for-profit E argued for a more fine-grained differential pricing system, and politician B, 
who was deeply committed to private provision and PbR, argued for separate schemes for 
mainstream JSA as opposed to ESA claimants. Even our DWP interviewee sought to protect 
clients from being ‘parked’ using the tools at hand (manager 1, funder A, wave 2).  
   
German placement vouchers allow a voucher-holding client, rather than the government 
purchaser, to choose the provider. This market was deliberately created to open up provision 
to for-profits and, unlike Germany’s training voucher scheme, does not even involve an 
accreditation process. Transactions are highly frequent, since vouchers are received from 
clients and redeemed with the funder on an ongoing basis. Prices are fixed in law (at €2000-
2500) and frozen in nominal terms from their 2002 introduction to the time of writing (2017). 
The funder did not clearly specify the service itself, although our site visit at for-profit B 
suggests that low prices created little scope for a service beyond a quick job placement. 
Figure 3 summarises the placement voucher market. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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 These providers were small specialised private firms with 10 or fewer direct 
employees, whose funding depended entirely on the vouchers. Germany’s voucher schemes 
create volatility for employment services providers, and the training voucher rollout led to a 
wave of insolvencies of training firms (for-profit A). These placement firms emerged after 
the vouchers were introduced, which created similar levels of uncertainty: for-profit B risked 
failing to attract enough clients or employers, which led to a focus on coordinating with 
front-line (public sector) Jobcenter workers to advertise its available job openings (manager 
1, waves 1 and 2). Although the potential clientele is extremely broad – including both short-
term and long-term unemployed – placement vouchers constitute a small market: numbers of 
placements nationwide ranged from 50,000 to 68,000 in 2004-9 (Bernhard and Kruppe 2010). 
One big city Jobcenter manager reported annual local spending of €200,000 and described 
providers as one-person operations (funder A, second wave).  
At for-profit B the labour process has some similarities with Work Programme 
providers – IT systems were used for monitoring and speed – but the process was quicker. 
One worker described sorting of clients through a ‘gut feeling’ acquired after 5 or 10 minutes 
of initial conversation, mainly small talk (‘Did you get here all right? Would you like some 
coffee?’); on average it took three days from first meeting with a client to job placement (for-
profit B, front-line worker 1).  
Another similarity was a lack of professional autonomy. The manager viewed 
qualified social workers as ‘the worst’, because they spent excessive time discussing 
problems with job seekers rather than making a job placement (manager, wave 1). Front-line 
interviewees reported threats of punitive firing (‘arbeitsrechtliche Konsequenzen’), the 
frequent non-renewal of 6-month contracts used for new hires, and the use of low base pay 
(€1200 per month) plus €80 in bonuses per job placement to motivate staff (front-line 
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workers 1-4). The manager was a strong believer in bonuses, since ‘workers on a fixed salary 
do their job . . . but if you’re working on a commission you step on it’ (manager, wave 2)! 
Workers quickly identified ‘creamed’ clients to receive a service and ‘parked’ clients 
to be sent back to the Jobcenter. At for-profit B, clients were either selected for an interview 
with an employer or sent away with a document stating that the meeting had taken place. The 
manager emphasised that this was a tightly focused job-placement service providing 
employers with precisely suited applicants (‘Paßgenaue Arbeitsvermittlung’), that 
requirements to justify how it served clients would impose high administrative costs. He gave 
an example of a large recruitment illustrate the value of selection for employability: 
There were 188 candidates sent by the Jobcenter. We had 80 people who showed up 
for interviews. . .  They could not fulfil the requirements of the job, smelled of 
alcohol, didn’t bring the application forms, were wearing jogging suits: it was a 
catastrophe. Out of these, 3 people got job interviews. The employer said, OK, we’ll 
hire them . . . The employer could see the rejects [Schrott] sent over . . . and said, 
‘never again the Jobcenter.’ They would have received 188 applicants and had a huge 
task to process them (manager, wave 2).    
No funding was available for additional services, although the manager showed 
interest in the new ‘placement and activation vouchers’ that could fund coaching and 
training. These interviewees saw little problem with quickly selecting clients for 
employability for particular jobs, not only by gauging clients’ enthusiasm but also appraising 
features specific to the job such as physical strength and criminal record (manager, front-line 
worker B). To our interviewees, this seemed to be the task set by the voucher.  
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The decline of non-commercial models 
The section examines the mechanism through which marketisation puts pressure on non-
commercial providers that resist pressures to cream and park. In both countries we visited 
established nonprofit providers that had undergone a transition to marketisation, but without 
adopting a commercial model; in particular, management control was relatively loose. In both 
countries, non-commercial providers faced a shift away from closed and stable local 
networks and towards the opening of provision, a price squeeze and time-bound contracts. 
These nonprofits were under financial pressure: redundancies were common, and 
interviewees often questioned the financial sustainability of the services. Creaming and 
parking was to be avoided, but with varying degrees of success.  
 
Purchasing by the Bundesagentur für Arbeit (Germany’s public employment service) 
reflected a shift away from non-marketised grant funding, which had historically been used to 
cover the costs of services delegated to nonprofits affiliated with churches, social partners, or 
established social movements (and was still used for make-work schemes). Competition was 
open, with an online procurement platform, and providers selected through price and quality 
criteria. Bids could be excluded for being below a quality threshold, but according to 
numerous management interviewees, price was crucial for selecting providers. Transactions 
were less frequent than vouchers due to contracts lasting 6-24 months and extension options 
(for the funder) of up to 2 years. Services were increasingly standardised in part because the 
funder developed a national catalogue of more than 40 off-the-shelf courses or schemes 
(‘Standardprodukte’) (funder B). At the end of the research, the Bundesagentur reported 
concluding 13,000 contracts per year worth €2 billion (presentation, Düsseldorf 24 April 
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2015), the largest market in our sample, albeit one in decline due to austerity and a decline in 
unemployment (Greer et al 2017, appendix C). Figure 4 summarises this contracting market. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
These services were governed through tight control by the funder, reinforced by price-
based competition in purchasing. International for-profit providers told us that low prices and 
small contracts made Germany a less profitable market than Britain (for-profit providers C & 
D). The nonprofits had longer histories than the commercial providers discussed, as providers 
of state-funded services delegated under the subsidiarity principle, in keeping with the 
German nonprofit ‘model’ (Bode 2003). They included some of Germany’s largest private 
employers operating hospitals, nursing homes and other social services alongside 
employment services and using make-work schemes to maintain facilities (the Catholic 
charity Caritas, the Protestant Diakonie, and Social Democratic Arbeiterwohlfahrt); other 
smaller nonprofits, were often initiated by activist social workers working with women, 
immigrants, and disabled people in neighbourhoods. Despite the evident proximity of such 
organizations to the clientele, the funder’s aim was not to empower them. One told us, ‘we 
design services for job seekers and not for providers’ (funder A, wave 2); others cited legal 
principles of transparency and equal treatment enshrined in European law and needed 
improvements in value for money (funder B). 
Although the funder maintained tight control on providers, providers we visited did 
not impose such control over their workers. At nonprofit B, front-line workers saw 
joblessness as just one among many needs to be addressed, which were assessed in two half-
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day sessions. Identifying and addressing complex social needs takes time, our interviewees 
argued (front-line worker 1 and 2). Assessment, referrals, and day-to-day work, were 
designed by front-line workers, who were generally hostile to the idea of a one-sided focus 
on job placements. One saw ‘human dignity’ as a top priority in line with his Christian faith 
and targets a matter for management but not staff (front-line worker 2); another with an 
activist background argued that clients ‘need a lobby’ (front-line worker 3); a third would 
have welcomed a results orientation (front-line worker 4).  
The labour process exhibited semi-autonomy in part because nonprofit B recruited 
front-line workers with a university degree in social work and/or adult education (typically 
Sozialpädagogik). Advisors were responsible for advising clients, making contacts with 
employers, referring them to other services, and documenting the work; there was a 
specialised coach as well. Job-placement numbers were discussed in team meetings ‘every 2-
3 weeks and on a weekly basis when placement numbers are low’, and only in cases of very 
poor performance would managers speak to workers about hitting targets (managers 3 and 4, 
wave 2); one front-line worker claimed not to know what would happen if the collective 
target of job placements was not met (front-line worker 2). Staff told us that data entry was 
taking time away from working directly with clients, but it was not to manage individual 
performance; one worker admitted not knowing what exactly should be entered and pointed 
out that the Jobcenter could not access clients’ files (front-line worker 1).  
Insecurity was a serious problem in the providers we visited, as it is generally in the 
sector (Gläser 2010). We talked with managers at a medium-sized provider that had made 
one-third of its workforce redundant due to a sudden fall in funding (nonprofit A, wave 1) 
and a small provider had exited employment services when it had lost its contract to a 
competitor (nonprofit C, wave 2). For its part, nonprofit B had recently reduced its front-line 
workforce from 10 to 4 and was employing any new staff on 12-month contracts. 
	 24	
Interviewees expected the current scheme to be cancelled (managers 1 & 2, wave 2; front-line 
worker 2). Management’s ability to use this insecurity to improve performance was limited; 
that insecurity was a result of financial pressures resulting from the Bundesagentur’s funding 
practices.   
Nonprofit B exhibited no creaming or parking. Assessment and sorting often led to 
referrals to further services (often day care for clients’ children [front-line worker C]) as well 
as to employment. According to management, 60% of clients referred were unemployable, 
profiling was used to identify these clients and their needs, and it was not possible to send 
clients back to the Jobcenter (unlike with placement vouchers). While providing intensive 
services for needy clients was consistent with the professional ethos of staff and 
organisational model of the provider, this funding arrangement did not necessarily cover the 
provider’s costs. Managers planned to exit the programme if it did not hit a placement rate of 
20% at the end of its contract (managers 1 & 2). 
 
British non-commercial providers and the local networks of which they were a part were, 
over the course of this study, weakened by the centrally driven marketisation process (see 
Finn 2015).  In the first wave we visited many non-commercial providers and local and 
regional funders; in the second wave we visited three Work Programme subcontractors (a 
nonprofit and two municipalities) and a nonprofit not on the Work Programme. Open 
competitive tendering, ‘service-level agreements’ that clearly specified the work, and 
contracts lasting 6-12 months had recently established themselves by wave 1 of interviews. In 
wave 2 all providers were subject to payment by results (i.e. job outcomes). While formal 
qualifications had never been as important as in Germany, both workers and managers 
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reported a voluntary-sector ethos, loose management control, and an intention to avoid 
creaming and parking. 
In wave 1, interviewees told us of a decline in the “usual inner-city money that the 
government kicks about that you can use” (politician a, wave 1) and worries of centrally 
planned marketised welfare-to-work schemes. Local funders had political and policy reasons 
to resist marketisation, including the lack of local knowledge of providers ‘parachuted in’ and 
the inappropriateness of payment by results for clients distant from the labour market 
(managers, funders B, C, and D, wave 1). As one told us, ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’ 
(funder E, wave 1); another describes non-marketised funding: 
In the old days, funding was not competitive. It was first come, first serve. There 
would be seven-year plans, organisations would approach the council with delivery 
plans. Eventually the money would run out, but there was a lot of building of 
capacity, showing people how to fill out the forms. There still are some grants, which 
are more flexible and get around some of the legal requirements around tendering. 
You don’t prescribe; the voluntary sector has to come up with ideas (manager 1, 
funder C, wave 1). 
In wave 2 we looked more closely at workplaces. At public sector G and nonprofits H 
& I, management used the electronic systems of the prime contractor, which, management 
interviewees told us, took a ‘hard line’ on performance. There were individual targets, but 
these could be quite low, and there were no performance-related bonuses (and in 
municipalities management discretion was limited by collective bargaining). At nonprofit C 
work was organised collectively, and workers were improvising, learning how to recruit 
employers to participate in the scheme; their division of labour emerged from front-line 
workers’ pre-existing skills rather than management planning or contract requirements 
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(nonprofit C, manager 2, wave 2). At these providers staff backgrounds were similar to the 
for-profits; two of the charities had recruited from for-profit welfare-to-work providers. Like 
the German nonprofits, job insecurity was reported at all of these providers as linked to the 
coming and going of contracts and not to performance management; many of our front-line 
interviewees were on temporary contracts and spoke of their jobs as something temporary, 
and we heard many examples of redundancies due to contracts ending.  
Although most non-commercial providers engaged in creaming and parking, they 
sometimes mitigated it using other sources of funding. For nonprofit H, creaming and parking 
was reportedly a matter of survival for a very small Work Programme subcontractor 
(manager 1), and at nonprofit C, creaming was built into the programme design set by the 
municipal funder with hard-to-place clients self-selecting out of the programme or sent back 
to the job centre (manager 1). At public sector C, while management and worker interviewees 
told us that the contract made creaming and parking ‘inevitable’, they mitigated it somewhat 
by funding support services through different funding streams. Public sector G used its 
internal resources to avoid creaming and parking: 
We have given every client the service they needed, regardless of the Work 
Programme pay model. We could do this because we operated the WP in conjunction 
with a grant-based social services programme. In effect, we have subsidised the WP 
with financial resources at the county’s disposal. However, we are gradually pulling 
out of the WP by stopping new referrals (manager 1). 
  
Marketisation and other institutional effects 
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The previous sections have documented differing marketisation effects in commercial and 
non-commercial providers. In this section we address our third research question: which 
national institutions might serve as a buffer for the landscape of service provision facing 
price-based competition?  We observed some institutional changes to cope with these effects. 
In Britain, managers were introducing a new professional qualification to cope with the 
problem of staff turnover and morale; in Germany, a new sector-specific minimum wage was 
set to cope with wage dumping. The most striking between-country difference was the role of 
formal qualifications in sustaining the non-commercial approach in Germany in the face of 
tough price-based competition.  
In British providers, the institutional regulation of work was relatively weak. In terms 
of collective bargaining and trade union presence, there was variation. At municipalities, 
some charities, and one for-profit provider with large numbers of former civil servants, trade 
union representatives were present. Trade unionists we interviewed, however, reported 
declining membership and workplace structures in the organisations where they were present 
– notably due to the turnover of contracts which led to staff turnover – and having at best 
aborted campaigns at the far more numerous firms where they had no structures (trade union 
A, staff 2-3, wave 2). Activists reported little influence over worker pay and bemoaned a lack 
of information even where they were present and reported servicing as more important than 
bargaining (lay officials 2 &3); this was confirmed by management (for-profit D, manager 1). 
For managers, the weak institutional regulation of work was also a problem. One 
study carried out by the sector’s umbrella body found that managers tend to see worker 
turnover as excessively high and perceive the lack of a clear track of career progression 
within the sector as one reason (Crawford and Perry 2010). The most common qualification 
for workers we interviewed was NVQ level 3 in Information, Advice and Guidance. The 
funder did not mandate it, and staff were recruited from an extremely wide range of fields, 
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including local government, retail sales, high-street recruitment agencies, the civil service, 
and the voluntary sector, including university graduates in psychologists and social work and 
former clients with unrelated qualifications.  
A management-driven initiative to address this problem, the Institute for Employment 
Professionals (IEP), was nascent at the time of research, but according to management 
interviewees was having success in attracting members and designing a new curriculum for 
the sector (for-profit H, umbrella D). Managers, however, had differences of opinion as to 
whether formal qualifications would necessarily develop the right kind of worker. The case 
against occupational regulation was put succinctly by one: ‘It’s important to remember this is 
a performance-driven industry: the best performing [advisor] may not be the most well 
qualified’ (Crawford and Perry 2010: 20).  
In Germany, we observed two market segments with different transactions, 
governance, labour process and services quality. Small companies operating under placement 
vouchers had a similar amount of discretion to Work Programme providers. The mixture of 
occupational backgrounds at for-profit B was similar to Work Programme prime providers: 
former clients, job centre staff, and sales occupations (manager, front-line workers 1-3). 
Similarly, for-profit A (operating under training vouchers) employed trainers with 
occupational backgrounds, and hourly pay that varied according to the areas in which they 
taught (manager, wave 1). For-profit A reported having too few directly employed employees 
to be covered by the works council law, since it relied extensively on freelance teachers 
(management), and none of the for-profits we visited had collective bargaining. 
Under purchasing, by contrast, providers tended to employ qualified social workers 
that had some form of worker representation. The contractor we examined in depth was 
operating under payment by results while exhibiting very strong professional autonomy in the 
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workplace. Workplace-level worker representatives did exist here and in most other providers 
we visited operating under contracts with the Bundesagentur. But their roles were restricted 
by the particular legal framework for trade union activities in German nonprofits (especially 
those covered by church law) and because staff turnover made it difficult to maintain trade 
union influence in the workplace outside the public sector (trade union B, staff 1-3). 
Moreover, the funder had decided not to stipulate adherence to collective agreements or wage 
minima in tendering processes, citing legal principles of autonomous collective bargaining 
and inter-regional differences in labour markets (wave 2, funder B).  
The funder, however, did often stipulate professional qualifications in the tendering 
documents, which our Bundesagentur interviewees saw as a way to limit wage dumping: in 
their view providers could not recruit qualified social workers for 12 euros per hour (ibid). 
Although prescribing staff qualifications, experience, and numbers in the tender specification 
was taken for granted by most interviewees, it was cited as an important difference between 
contracting in Germany and Great Britain by international providers (for-profits C & D). 
Without us having to raise the issue one interviewee told us that formal qualifications 
depend on the position and the scheme. In Germany it is much stricter in the tender 
specifications which qualification staff have to have. I have learned that in Britain you 
are allowed to employ whoever you want to – the main thing is you find people jobs 
in the labour market. Here [in Germany] you need a social work background or a 
completed apprenticeship and certain years of professional experience (manager 1). 
This did not stop downward pressure on wages or job insecurity (Gläser 2010), but it 
did matter for work organization. Management lacked the discretion to replace qualified 
social workers with a diverse mixture of results-oriented individuals, because the tender 
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specification did not permit it. As we saw above, qualified social workers resisted pressures 
to cream and park, because they disagreed with the work-first orientation of social policy. 
The national institutions that seem to matter are those governing skill formation, since 
this is at the root of the difference between Work Programme contractors and contractors for 
the Bundesagentur. But this is only half-correct. The commercial organization we visited 
operating under placement vouchers was not bound by that institutional constraint and 
engaged in creaming and parking. The Bundesagentur built requirements to employ qualified 
social workers into contracts for job-placement services but not for placement vouchers. 
Under contracting, these rules protected staff resisting financial pressures for creaming and 
parking in a way not seen in British employment services. In other words nonmarket 
institutions governing the workplace matters because they were supported by market-making 
funding practices. This echoes Jaehrling’s (2015) arguments about the potential of 
governments to use their power as purchasers to ratchet up social standards in the workplace.    
 
Conclusion 
Above we examined the causes of creaming and parking in marketised employment services. 
Funders in both countries configured transactions to promote tight price-based competition. 
We observed creaming and parking all of the Work Programme ‘prime contractors’ (for 
profits and a nonprofit) and the German placement vouchers (a for-profit firm). It was absent, 
however, from the German contractor (a large nonprofit). Non-commercial Work Programme 
subcontractors tried with varying degrees of success to avoid it (municipalities and a 
nonprofit). Table 3 summarises the differences between the cases along the conditions and 
outcomes presented in table 1.   
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INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Our first contribution is to provide a definition and operationalisation of marketisation 
that could cause workplace change in diverse contexts. The literature on public services tends 
to assume that the introduction of market mechanisms has been transformative (for good or 
ill), but there is no consensus on how to study marketisation. Most definitions – such as those 
used by most employment relations scholars – are ad hoc and developed in line with 
particular empirical findings. The governance literature provides a definition of marketisation 
that could be applied to a variety of settings, but the focus on broad principles is not helpful 
for capturing how specific features of markets translate into particular workplace practices. 
Our definition of marketisation, by contrast, specifies concrete features of transactions, 
including frequency, openness, standardisation, and the price mechanism, that could be used 
in the study of market-driven change. This can be used in public services and workplaces in 
other sectors where transactions plays an important role (Greer and Doellgast 2017). In the 
case study write-ups we describe qualitatively the workings of transactions along these four 
dimensions.  
Our second contribution is to identify two mechanisms through which marketisation 
produces creaming and parking. marketis The main theoretical insight here is that 
marketisation effects are not determined by the incentives set by funders (Anderson et al 
1993, Le Grand 2003). Inspired by the policy literature on governance (Considine and Lewis 
2003, Jantz et al 2015) and the sociological literature on public-service work (Baines 2004, 
Cunningham et al 2013, Esbenshade et al 2016), we argue commercial and non-commercial 
providers should respond differently.  
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To answer our first question (what are the mechanisms through which marketisation 
produces creaming and parking?), we pose a second question. Namely, what are the 
differences between these mechanisms in commercial and non-commercial providers? . We 
find that marketisation led to the rise of new forms of commercial provision characterised by 
tight management control and therefore prone to creaming and parking. German placement 
vouchers led to the creation of new placement firms, specialised in this kind of work; the 
Work Programme led to a takeover of most services by large private firms. We also find that 
marketisation corroded existing non-commercial forms of provision characterised by strong 
professional autonomy and resistant to creaming and parking. (See Greer et al 2017).  
Our third contribution concerns the role of national institutions in explaining 
differences between these providers in Germany and Britain. Drawing on comparative 
employment relations (Doellgast 2012, Greer et al 2013, Jaehrling 2015), we  ask a third 
question. Which national institutions might serve as a buffer for the landscape of service 
provision facing price-based competition? We find that commercial organizations in the two 
countries responded to broadly similar market conditions similarly, including engaging in 
creaming and parking. We also find in both countries differences between commercial and 
non-commercial organizations, in part because many non-profits are resisting pressures to 
commercialise. We find that collective bargaining, worker representation, and worker transfer 
rules had patchy effects in these countries, but that formal qualification frameworks helped to 
stabilise German nonprofits. 
The persistence of non-commercial organizations is somewhat surprising given the 
financial pressures. German nonprofits had the strongest resistance to marketisation pressures 
in the sample, not because of any automatic national-institutional effect (the relevant 
institutions did not constrain providers operating under voucher schemes), but because the 
purchaser had structured the transaction in a way that shored up institutional supports for 
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workers’ professional skills and the associated ethos. In particular, it specified formal 
qualifications in its description of the work, a powerful tool for preventing creaming and 
parking that could be used elsewhere.  
Nevertheless, these organizations are under pressure and in decline. Our interviewees 
in German nonprofits pointed to many problems posed by the Bundesagentur’s competitive 
funding practices. The high level of detail in which the work was prescribed created a huge 
administrative burden shouldered by front-line workers and sapped their capabilities to 
innovate. It also facilitated standardization, the comparison of offers, and extraction of price 
concessions, contributing to problems of low pay and job insecurity (which the funder 
refrained from regulating). Insecurity was exacerbated by a decline in the volume of funding. 
While the funder requires formal qualifications, its funding practices contribute in other ways 
to devaluation of the social work profession. 
In the Work Programme, loose regulation of for-profit companies led to creaming and 
parking, despite high payments for hard-to-place ESA clients. Beyond incentives, other 
organizational factors determined the way that providers served clients, notably management 
systems and the weak role of professional staff. To reverse rampant creaming and parking, 
the public funder could reconfigure the transaction to take these factors into account – e.g. by 
regulating working conditions and formal qualifications – but may also need to rebuild 
capacity in the non-profit and local-government sector. While this would not be easy or 
inexpensive, the British government was instrumental in building the commercial sector 
(Davies 2008) and could similarly intervene to rebuild non-commercial service provision. 
One limitation of our study is that the problems discussed above do not exist in every 
government-funded service subject to marketisation, and creaming and parking might appear 
under conditions not examined here. There is less scope for creaming where the outcome is 
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difficult to measure (as in many training courses or services for people deemed 
unemployable) or where the clientele is less diverse (as in a job-placement scheme for lone 
parents in a particular town) and there is consequently less scope for sorting. But evaluators 
find creaming and parking in other kinds of marketised services with measurable outcomes, 
incentives to achieve them, and the sorting of service users, such as private schools and 
health services. Future research could assess the conditions under which our two mechanisms 
appear, in employment services and beyond. 
A second limit concerns the effects of marketisation on service outcomes. We do not 
merely mean income, employment, and benefit payment, which in the aggregate are affected 
by marketisation and privatisation only in small and highly mediated ways (Krug and 
Stephan 2016) or the effects of payment by results on performance for disadvantaged job-
seekers being ‘parked’. The main outstanding question is: how has ‘creaming’ affected the 
labour market experiences of job-ready unemployed people (Greer 2016)? Understanding the 
signalling function of front-line workers in marketised employment services would illuminate 
the role of welfare reform in structuring inequality in present-day societies.   
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Table	1.	Commercial	and	non-commercial	providers.	Key	categories	and	questions	
	
		 Commercial		 Non-commercial	
	
Selection	of	clients	 Only	employability	
Job-ready	clients	identified	and	
served	and	neglect	of	more	needy	
clients	(creaming	and	parking)	
Employability	and	opportunity	
Job-ready	clients	identified	and	
served;	more	needy	clients	referred	
to	services	
	
1. The	transaction	
2. (Le	Grand	2003,	Greer	
and	Doellgast	2017)	
Emerge	under	marketisation	
Open	competition	
Clear	prescription	
Strong	price	mechanism	
Frequently	recurring	transactions	
Emerge	under	non-market	funding	
Closed	networks	
Co-production	of	services	
Price	not	decisive	
Provision	uninterrupted	by	
transactions	
	
Q1.	What	are	the	mechanisms	through	which	marketisation	produces	creaming	and	parking?		
	
3. Governance		
4. (Considine	and	Lewis	
2013,	Jantz	et	al	2015)	
Market	principles	
Commercial	providers,	including	
for-profit	
Accountability	through	quantitative	
measurement	of	results	
Narrowly	defined	work-first	services	
Nonmarket	principles	
Traditional	nonprofits	and	municipal	
providers	
Accountability	through	qualitative	
assessments		
Services	for	broadly	defined	needs	
5. The	labour	process		
6. (Baines	2004,	
Esbenshade	et	al	2016,	
Greer	et	al	2017)	
Tight	management	control	
IT	systems	used	to	manage	
performance	
Deskilling	
Speedup	of	work	
Punitive	firing	 	
Professional	autonomy	
IT	systems	used	for	reporting	and	
procedure	
Formal	qualifications	valued	
Slow	processes	
Layoffs	at	contract	end	
	
Q2.	What	are	the	differences	between	these	mechanisms	in	commercial	and	non-commercial	service	
providers?	
7. National	institutions		
8. (Doellgast	2012,	
Jaehrling	2015)	
Liberalization	
Weak	limits	to	management	
discretion	
Strong	non-market	institutions	
Management	discretion	limited	by	
skills	frameworks	or	industrial	
relations	institutions,	underpinned	
by	contracting	rules	
	
Q3.	Which	national	institutions	might	serve	as	a	buffer	for	the	landscape	of	service	provision	facing	
price-based	competition?			
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Table	2.	Interviews	and	interviewees	
	
Great-Britain	Wave	1:	2006-2011	(51	interviews)	 	 Wave	2:	2011-14	(51	interviews)	 	
Code	 Note	 Interviewees	 	 Code	 Note	 Interviewees	
Funder	A	 DWP	 2	managers	 	 Funder	A	 DWP	 2	managers	
Funder	B	 Regional	Development	Agency	 2	managers		 	 Providers	 	 	
Funder	C	 Local	authority	 3	managers		 	 Public	sector	G	 Local	authority	subcontractor	on	Work	Programme	(WP)	
2	managers,		
4	front-line	staff	
Funder	D	 Job	Centre	Plus	(JCP)	 1	manager	 	 Public	sector	H	 Local	authority	subcontractor	WP	 	1	manager	
Funder	E	 Learning	and	Skills	Council	 1	manager	 	 Nonprofits	H	&	I	 Local	charity	subcontractor	WP	 	1	manager	each	
Funder	F	 Welsh	Assembly	Government	 1	manager		 	 Nonprofit	J	 Large	charity	subcontractor	WP	 	1	manager	
Providers	 	 	 	 Nonprofit	C	 Charity	not	on	WP	 3	managers,		5	front-line	staff	
Public	sector	A	 JCP	 3	managers	 	 Nonprofit	K	 Large	charity	prime	provider	WP	 3	managers,		7	front-line	staff	
Public	sector	B	 Local	authority		 1	manager	4	front-line	staff	 	 For-Profit	D	 Multinational	prime	provider	WP	
3	managers,		
4	front-line	staff	
Public	sector	C	 Local	authority	 2	managers	 	 For-Profits	E-H	 Multinational	prime	providers	WP	 I	manager	each	
Nonprofit	A-D	 Charity	 1	manager	each	 	 Others	 	 	
Nonprofit	E	 Charity	 7	front-line	staff	 	 Politician	B	 1	member	of	Parliament	with	researcher	
Others	 	 	 	 Umbrella	D	 Spokesperson	for	the	Employment	Related	Services	Association	
UK	Treasury	 2	managers	 	 Trade	union	A	 Public	and	Commercial	Services	Union.	4	staff,	3	lay	officers	
Politician	A	 1	member	of	parliament	 	 Consultancy	 1	manager	 	
Cabinet	Office	 1	manager	 	 	 	 	
Umbrella	A-C	 Infrastructure	bodies	for	the	voluntary	sector,	1	manager	each	 	 	 	 	
TUC	 3	policy	officers,	1	UnionLearn	staff	 	 	 	 	
Trade	union	A	 3	staff,	1	lay	official	at	UNISON	 	 	 	 	
Trade	union	B	 4	staff	at	AMICUS	 	 	 	 	
Consultant	 1	human	resources	consultant	 	 	 	 	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Germany	Wave	1:	2006-2011	(26	interviews)	 									Wave	2:	2011-14	(20	interviews)	
Funder	A	
Local	Jobcenter	/	
municipality	
2	managers	 	 Funder	A	 Local	Jobcenter	 1	manager	
Providers	 	 	 	 Funder	B	
Regionales	Einkaufszentrum	
(REZ),	BA	
2	managers	
Public	sector	A	
Bundesagentur	für	
Arbeit	(BA)	
2	works	councilors	 	 Providers	 	 	 	
Public	sector	B	 Local	Jobcenter	
1	manager	
3	works	councilors	
	 Public	sector	C	 Jobcenter	 1	manager		
Nonprofits	A,	B,	C,	G	 Association	 2	managers	each	 	 Nonprofit	B	 Large	charity	BA	contractor	
2	managers,		
4	front-line	staff	
Nonprofit	D	 Association	 2	works	councilors		 	 For-profit	B	
Small	firm	operating	under	
placement	vouchers	
2	managers,	5	
front-line	workers	
Nonprofit	E,	F	 Association	 1	manager	each	 	 For-profits	C	&	D	 Multinational	firms	 1	manager	each	
For-profits	A	&	B	 Small	firms	 1	manager	each	 	 Nonprofits	C	&	H	 Small	charities	BA	contractors	 1	manager	each	
Others	
Parliament	
	
1	SPD	researcher	
	 	 Other	 	
Trade	union	A	 2	IG	Metall	staff	 	 	 Umbrella	A	
1	manager	at	Deutscher	Paritätischer	
Wohlfahrtsverband	
Trade	union	B	 3	ver.di	staff	 	 	 	 	 	
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Table	3.	Summary	of	the	cases	
	 	
Organisational	model	 Commercial	
	
Non-Commercial	
Market	segment	 British	WP	
Primes	
German	Job	
Placement	Vouchers	
British	WP	
Subcontractors	
German		BA	
Contractors	
Organisations	 Nonprofit	and		
for-profits	
For-profit	 Small	nonprofits	
and	municipalities	
Large	nonprofit	
Client	selection	
Employability	 H	 	 H	 H	 H	
Opportunity	 L	 	 L	 H/L	 H	
Creaming	and	parking	 H	 	 H	 H/L	 L	
Governance	principles	of	funder	
Commercial	orientation	of	
providers	
H	 		 H	 L	 H/L	
Work-first	approach	 H	 	 H	 H/L		 H/L	
Quantitative	results	
orientation	
H	
	
	 H	 H	
	
H	
Labour	process	at	provider	
Individual	targets	used	 H/L	 	 H	 L	 L	
Deskilling	 H	 	 H	 H	 L	
Speed	of	processes	 H	 	 H	 H/L	 L	
Punitive	firing	 H/L	 	 H	 L	 L	
National	institutions	
Importance	of:	
Worker	representation	and	
collective	bargaining	
H/L	 	 L	 H/L	 H	
Formal	qualifications	 L	 	 L	 L	 H	
L	=	low,	H	=	high,	H/L	=	mixed.	
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i ESA, introduced in 2008, replaced three different benefits for disabled people with the aim 
of tightening work requirements. JSA, introduced in 1995-6, is the main benefit for able-
bodied job seekers.  
																																								 																				
